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Disorder in the Courts: Public School Student Expression on
the Internet
Brian Oten*

I. INTRODUCTION

A Pennsylvania high school student hates his school's
athletic director. In an attempt to be funny, and to get back at the
athletic director in the only way the student knows how, the student
creates a "Top Ten" list at home. The list, which contains crude
remarks and humiliating observations about the athletic director, is
emailed to a number of the student's friends. The student's friends
think the list is hilarious, and at least one person prints the email
out at home and brings it to school to show more people.
Eventually, the athletic director comes across the list. Outraged by
the content of the email, the athletic director shows the list to other
school officials, and the student is threatened with suspension. The
student insists he never meant for the list to come to school, much
less be seen by the athletic director, and that he only meant for the
original email recipients to see it. Despite these pleadings, the
student is suspended from school.'
The American adult population enjoys a broad sense of the
right to freedom of speech, as defined by the Supreme Court over
the course of American history.2 However, the Court's opinion

* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005.
The author would like to thank Professor Gayle Carper of Western Illinois
University for starting him down this path.
1. See generally Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446,
449 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
2. "The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects."
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (invalidating a city law that
prohibited racially discriminatory speech).
"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
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changes when considering speech on school grounds. Over the past
three decades, the Supreme Court has given broad power to local
school boards to regulate student expression. School officials can
now regulate student speech that causes a material or substantial
disruption, that is lewd or indecent, or that is related to school
sponsored activities! While the Court's decision to grant such
regulatory power over student expression to the local school boards
has been upheld by subsequent courts over the past three decades,
American courts are now faced with a new dilemma-the Internet.
Using the Internet, students have the ability to easily
"speak" with virtually any fellow student at any time. This new
medium of communication is causing disruption in the flow of the
classroom. Students are creating websites, sending emails, or
simply "speaking" in chat rooms with fellow students about schoolrelated issues ranging from teacher approval to local athletic team
rivalries.' To complicate matters, the integration of technology into
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (holding that burning an American flag was individual

speech protected by the First Amendment).
"[1l]t is... often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (holding that a man in a courthouse wearing
a jacket bearing the slogan "Fuck the Draft" was protected by the First
Amendment).
"Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by the
First Amendment from infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental
personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment from invasion by state action." Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 450 (1938) (invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting distribution of
literature without a permit).
3. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969).
4. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
5. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Deeper in My Depression, at http://www.oopsfaking.blogspot.com (chronicling through poetry one student's personal
experiences at school) (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (on file with the First
Amendment Law Review); Danielle "Psychochick", I Did IW!, at
http://www.ujournal.org/users/psychochick/1012.html (publishing her school
report card along with explicative-laden commentary on her teachers as part
of an online journal) (June 26, 2002) (on file with the First Amendment Law
Review); RateMy Teachers.com, at http://www.ratemyteachers.com (providing
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the classroom has made the Internet more accessible from school
than ever before.
Thus, disruptive student Internet speech
frequently spills into the classroom, whether it is intended to go
there or not.' As a result, some school officials have punished
student Internet speakers in order to maintain a more orderly
educational environment. Recent cases in Pennsylvania exemplify
the current confusion among the lower courts regarding student
Internet speech.'
This note examines whether public school
officials can regulate Internet speech created off-campus by public
school students. This Note concludes that all student speech
created off campus should be fully protected by the First
Amendment. Student Internet speech, created off campus, should
also retain its off campus classification unless the student author
intends or takes action to bring his or her speech on campus.
Finally, if the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District is applied to
on-campus Internet speech, the court should view the Tinker test
through the eyes of a reasonable person.

a forum for students to "publicly expose ineffective teachers and broadcast
praise for stellar teachers") (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
7. See also Alexander G. Tuneski, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting
Student Internet Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 140 (2003) ("Today, the threat of
disruption from off-campus student speech has risen significantly because of
the advent of the internet and continued efforts to integrate the medium into
the classroom setting.").
8. See generally Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698
(W.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that a student handbook policy that did not
geographically limit school officials' authority to discipline student speech to
the school premises or school-sponsored events was unconstitutionally vague);
Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001)
(applying Tinker to off-campus speech and holding that a student's suspension
for writing an offensive email targeting a school official was unconstitutional);
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002) (holding that a
student website that contained threatening messages about teachers was oncampus speech that disrupted the school community).
9. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (holding that student speech that "materially
disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others" is not protected by the First Amendment).

406
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II. THE STUDENT SPEECH TRIUMVIRATE

Students' free speech in the school environment is restricted
when compared to other forms of speech in American society.
Courts have given school boards the ability to limit student speech
in ways that ordinarily would not be permissible when applied to
adults speaking in a traditional public forum.'0 Specifically, the
United States Supreme Court has decided three cases that set the
basic guidelines for lower courts and school boards to follow when
addressing student speech in public schools.
First, in the landmark decision,
Des Moines
..
11 Tinker v.
Independent Community School District, the Court held that a
school could not punish students for wearing armbands in protest of
the Vietnam War.'2 Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, stated that
"[iut can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."' 3 The Court noted the importance of free
speech in society4 and established that in restricting a student's

10. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) ("[T]he

constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) ("Without first establishing discipline and
maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students."); Shanley
v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 968 (5th Cir. 1972) ("There is, of
course, a substantive difference between schools and the street corner in terms
of weighing the sometimes competing interests of a completely free flow of
any and all expression with the requirement that there be order and
discipline.").
11. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
12. Id. at 512-13.
13. Id. at 506.
14. Id. at 508-09. The Court observed:
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the
campus, that deviates from the views of another person
may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our
Constitution says we must take this risk; and our history
says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of
openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of
the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up
and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious,
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speech, a school must show that "its action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."' 5
Although the Court acknowledged that "students are entitled to
freedom of expression of their views,'
it recognized other
meritorious considerations in educational settings and created a test
to determine whether school officials can restrict the speech of its
students:
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it,
which for any reason-whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior-materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech."
The Court added that a school may also restrict certain
speech if it has "reason to anticipate that [the speech] would
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon
the rights of other students."' This test has become the benchmark
used by courts in determining whether a school can regulate a
student's speech or expression.
The Court was again asked to determine the
constitutionality of a school board's restraint of student speech in
Bethel School District v. Fraser.' In that case, a student was
suspended for making a speech at a school assembly using various
sexual innuendoes that the school found inappropriate. While the
society.

Id. (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 31 (1949).
15. Id. at 509; see also Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088,
1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) ("[Tjhe Ninth Circuit has held that student
distribution of non-school-sponsored material cannot be prohibited 'on the
basis of undifferentiated fears of possible disturbances or embarrassment to
school officials.' " (quoting Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir.
1988))).
16. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
17. Id. at 513.
18. Id. at 509.
19. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
20. Id. at 678.
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Court again recognized that students have free speech rights in
school, it found that a school could restrict student speech if the
speech was "lewd, indecent, or offensive."2 ' Additionally, the Court
noted that "the constitutional rights of students in public school are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings., 2' The Court justified this more restrictive view of student
speech by balancing the free speech rights of the students against
society's interest in educating its youth.Y- Thus, as a result of Fraser,
a school has the power to determine what is or is not appropriate
for student speech within the school itself in light of its basic
24
educational mission.
Finally, the Court decided in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier1 that a school principal has the authority to censor the
school newspaper and its student-writers, despite the students' First
Amendment rights. 26 The Court determined that when a school
newspaper was involved, "educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities
so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. 2 7 Additionally, the Court refused to classify
21. Id. at 683.
22. Id. at 682.
23. Id. at 681 ("The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and
controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the
society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior.").
24. Id. at 683. The Court stated:
The determination of what manner of speech in the
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly
rests

with

the

school

board....

The

schools,

as

instruments of the state, may determine that the essential
lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a
school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech
and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy.
Id.; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) ("A

school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic
educational mission.' " (citing Fraser,478 U.S. at 685)).
25. 484 U.S. 260 (1988)
26. Id. at 274-75.
27. Id. at 273.
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the school newspaper as a traditional public forum, granting the
State more power to regulate the speech occurring therein. 2s The
Court felt that the school need not "lend its name and resources to
the dissemination of student expression. '
As a result of this
ruling, a school board only needs a "valid educational purpose" to
justify its restriction of student speech occurring within a school
sponsored activity.30
As a result of the Supreme Court's triumvirate of student
speech cases, a school may restrict or punish student speech when
the speech materially or substantially interferes with normal
classroom procedures or when the school has reason to anticipate
such disorder.3" Further, a school may also restrict or punish
student speech that is "lewd, indecent, or offensive 3 2 or that is
involved in a "school-sponsored expressive activit[y]," 3 without
examining whether the speech materially or substantially interfered
with daily school procedures.

28. Id. at 267. The Court stated:
The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of
streets, parks, and other traditional public forums that
"time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assemble, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions." . . . If the facilities have
instead been reserved for other intended purposes,
"communicative or otherwise," then no public forum has
been created, and school officials may impose reasonable
restrictions on speech of students, teachers, and other
members of the school community.
Id. (quoting from Hague v. Committee .for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S.
496, 515 (1939), and Perry Educational Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983)) (citations omitted).

29. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 272-73.
30. ld. at 273.
31. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969).
32. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
33. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273.
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IlI. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ON-CAMPUS
AND OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH

Lower courts have attempted to define the boundary
between on-campus and off-campus speech by using the language
in Tinker, Bethel, and Hazelwood. However, without a clear
Supreme Court precedent, lower court decisions have landed all
over the spectrum.
The Court stated in Tinker that speech, whether "in class or
out of it,, 35 which causes a material or substantial disruption in
school activities could be regulated by school officials. Taken
literally, one might infer the Court intended this standard to apply
to off-campus speech. When read as a whole, however, the
language of the Tinker decision suggests that the Court did not
equate "out of class" with "off campus.",3' A broad application of
Tinker to off-campus speech is undermined by the Court's
description of outside the "classroom hours, 37 as "in the cafeteria,
or on the playing field, or on the campus during authorized
hours."3 Thus, the Court's definition of "out of class" is more
accurately understood to mean beyond the classroom but still on
school grounds. The Court also stated that they had consistently

34. See Louis John Seminski, Jr., Tinkering with Student Free Speech:
The Internet and the Need for a New Standard, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 172

(2001) ("[T~he courts' holdings have been vague at best, resulting in a plethora
of inconsistent decisions in the lower courts.").
35. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
36. See Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating
Uncensored Anonymous Internet Forums, 39 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 93, 141-42

(2003). Caplan argues:
[The Tinker Court's] reference to student conduct "out of

class" does not mean "out of school" because the entire
discussion deals with student conduct "on the campus
during the authorized hours" . .. Tinker's "in class or out
of it" language hardly suggests that school administrators

may apply the same level of control to students in the
world at large as they do within school grounds.

Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13).
37. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.

38. Id. at 512-13.
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reaffirmed the power of schools "to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools."3'9 When the Tinker Court referred to events outside
of the normal classroom hours, it was not extending its ruling to
speech occurring off school grounds.4 °
The other cases of the triumvirate have also recognized that
permissible restrictions are limited to on-campus speech. Justice
Brennan, in a concurring opinion in Fraser and relying on the
Court's decision in Cohen v. California,4' noted in dicta, "[i]f
respondent had given the same speech outside of the school
environment, he could not have been penalized simply
because
,,41
.
•
government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.
The Hazelwood Court also echoed Justice Brennan's concurrence
in drawing its own distinction between on-campus and off-campus
student speech, 43 and the holding in Hazelwood was again restricted
to speech occurring on school grounds.4
In attempting to apply the language of these Supreme Court
decisions to modern situations, lower courts have recognized this
difference between on- and off-campus speech. Their application
of this distinction to the Internet, however, has produced various

39. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
40. See Caplan, supra note 36, at 141-42.
41. 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971) (deciding that a man wearing a jacket with
the words "Fuck the Draft" on the jacket was engaging in expression
protected by the First Amendment).
42. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
43. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) ("A

school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic
educational mission,' even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school." (quoting Fraser,478 U.S. at 685)).
44. Id. The Court stated:
[Students] cannot be punished merely for expressing their
personal views on the school premises- whether "in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during
the authorized hours"-unless school authorities have
reason to believe that such expression will "substantially
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the
rights of other students."

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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results.15 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that "a threshold
issue regarding the 'location' of the speech must be resolved to
determine if the unique concerns regarding the school environment
are even implicated, i.e., is it on campus speech or purely offcampus speech?"4" Yet, in the same case the Pennsylvania court
held that a website created off campus became on-campus speech
41
because the site was accessed on campus.
Federal appellate courts have varied in their application of
this distinction as well. In 1972, the Fifth Circuit overtly passed on
an opportunity to issue an opinion regarding the differences
between on- and off-campus student speech, illustrating its
reluctance to take on such an important yet ambiguous subject.4
However, while the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in
Shanley that it was not necessary to define a rule regarding offcampus student speech, the court still stated "that it is not at all
unusual to allow the geographical location of the actor to determine
the constitutional protection that should be afforded to his or her
acts,, 49 and that "the width of a street might very well determine the
breadth of the school board's authority."50 The Fifth Circuit thus
suggested that it is open to the possibility that a student's freedom
of speech differs when the student is outside the school's walls. The
court recognized that a person between the ages of five and sixteen
has two identities-student and citizen-which subject the person
to two separate bodies of law. 5' These separate identities, assigned

45. See Seminski, supra note 34, at 167-68.
46. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002).

47. Id. at 864-65.
48. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974 (5th Cir.
1972). The court in Shanley held an underground student newspaper, created
and distributed off campus, could not be regulated by school officials, even
though the newspaper was brought on school grounds by its readers.
However, instead of establishing a line between off-campus and on-campus
student speech, the court stated, "[W]e do not feel it necessary to hold that
any attempt by a school district to regulate conduct that takes place off the
school ground and outside school hours can never pass constitutional muster."
Id.
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 974; see infra note 52.
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to the individual by the environment the person presently finds
himself or herself, should not interfere with each other in the
context of free speech . If a young person is classified at all times
as a student, and thus subjected to the broader restrictions of
student speech, the ability of young people to function in society as
private citizens is greatly diminished. In recognition of students'
identity as citizens, the Ninth Circuit has found that non-schoolsponsored material, such as Internet expression created by students,
is "entirely outside the school's supervision or control," even if the
9
target audience was the school's students.
With the exception of the Ninth Circuit, courts that have
had ample opportunity to state an opinion on off-campus speech
have not elaborated their thoughts on the distinction.
Instead,
courts have either restricted their rulings to address only on-campus
speech activity or have avoided this conflict by characterizing offi
52. See id. The court reasoned:
An offense against one authority that it perpetrated
within the jurisdiction of another authority is usually
punishable only by the authority in whose jurisdiction the
offense took place.... Students, as any other citizens, are
subject to the civil and criminal laws of the community,
state, and nation. A student acting entirely outside school
property is potentially subject to the laws of disturbing the
peace... and so forth, whether or not he is potentially
subject to a school regulation that the school board wishes
to extend to off-campus activity.
Id. (emphasis added).

53. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089-90 (W.D. Wash.
2000).
Emmett concerned a student, Nick Emmett, who created a website of
mock obituaries of fellow students at Emmett's high school. Id. at 1089. The

site stated the content was not sponsored by the school and was for
entertainment purposes only. Id. It also allowed visitors to vote on who would
"die" next-meaning whose mock obituary would be posted. Id. The Emmett
court found this type of student speech outside the control of school officials.
Id. at 1090.
54. See generally Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960

(5th Cir. 1972) (refusing to create a distinct boundary between on-campus and
off-campus speech); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446
(W.D. Pa. 2001) (applying the Tinker test to off-campus speech without
articulating a distinction between the two settings).
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campus speech as on-campus speech because the speech
unintentionally reached school grounds or the school population."
Courts seem to be confused with the application of precedent in the
context of Internet off-campus speech.
IV. THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNET.

"The internet has emerged as a forum where students can
gossip, express criticisms, vent their frustrations, and challenge the
status quo. ,1 6 This speech occurs both on-campus and off-campus,
but a number, and arguably the most significant, of cases arising
today concern a student's creation of Internet material off school
grounds. A student uses his or her own resources to express him or
herself, and thus the expression is not connected with the school in
any way. A connection occurs only when the speech concerns the
school or its officers or is brought onto the campus through access
to the Internet. The Internet creates a number of novel issues
involving the public's right to freedom of speech because of its
unique accessibility and potential for discourse, as well as potential
for defamation.57
The United States Congress has recognized that the
Internet "offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues
for intellectual activity.",58 While Congress seems excited about the

55. See, e.g., Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (holding that speech
originating off campus but unintentionally arriving on campus could be
punished if it satisfied the Tinker test). Contra Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks Sch.
Dist, 247 F. Supp. 2d 698 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that a student handbook
policy which did not geographically limit school officials' authority to
discipline student speech to school premises or school-sponsored events was
unconstitutionally vague).
56. Tuneski, supra note 7, at 143.
57. See Philip T.K. Daniel & Patrick Pauken, The Electronic Media and
School Violence: Lessons Learned and Issues Presented, 164 ED. LAW REP. 1,
2 (2002) ("The difficulty here is for educators to control dangerous and violent
Internet conduct and in striking a proper balance between the traditional
notions of education in a democracy and the exponential growth and speed of
largely unregulated communication in cyberspace.").
58. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (1998).
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potential of the Internet, it does encourage the development of
filtering programs to be used on the Internet, which would screen
what type of information is received by families or schools.59 In
order to receive funds to purchase Internet-accessible computers,
Congress has required school libraries to use Internet filtering
programs that would protect students from receiving information
that is "obscene ' ' 0 or "harmful to minors.""
Different speech regulations can be applied depending on
the type of forum in which the speech is made. 62 Already, the
Supreme Court has found that Internet speech is deserving of First
Amendment protection. 63 However, as with other forms of speech,

59. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3)-(4) (1998).
60. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2000).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i)(III) (2000).
62. See, e.g., Draudt v. Wooster City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 246 F. Supp.
2d 820, 826-27 (N.D. Ohio 2003). The court observed:
For purposes of free speech analysis, the Supreme Court
has identified three types of fora: 1) the traditional public
forum; 2) the limited public forum or designated public
forum; and 3) the non-public forum.... Generally, the
law does not consider public schools to be traditional
public fora.... In traditional and limited public fora, the
government may impose content-based restrictions on
speech only if they are necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and are narrowly tailored to that end....
Conversely, in nonpublic fora, restrictions on speech need
only be "reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view."
Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983)) (citations omitted).
63. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70, 885 (1997). In Reno, the
Court held that the Communications Decency Act was unconstitutionally
overbroad and that the Internet should not be equated with other mediums of
communication for determining the level of First Amendment scrutiny
applicable. In deciding Internet speech was worthy of First Amendment
protection, the Court observed:
In [previous] cases, the Court relied on the history of
extensive Government regulation of the broadcast
medium, the scarcity of available frequencies at its
inception, and its "'invasive" nature. Those factors are not

416

FIRSTAMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

the Court might very well decide that the standards for restriction
of Internet speech "are lower in a public school,M4 and that a school
can regulate speech occurring on school grounds or in connection
with the school.65 For example, the school's policy toward the
student paper in Hazelwood was to "not restrict free expression or6
diverse viewpoints within the rules of responsible journalism."
However, the Court found:
School officials did not evince either "by policy
present in cyberspace.
Neither before nor after the
enactment of the [Communications Decency Act] have
the vast democratic forums of the Internet been subject to
the type of government supervision and regulation that
has attended the broadcast industry ....
. "ITIhe content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought."
... The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of
ideas contradicts the [Government's assertion that
regulation of Internet speech is required to attract more
Internet users]. The record demonstrates that the growth
of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal.
As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to
encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of
expression in a democratic society outweighs any
theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.
Id. at 868-70, 885 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 2d 824, 842 (1996))
(citations omitted).
64. Draudt, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 827; see also Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478
F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973) ("In the secondary school setting first
amendment rights are not coextensive with those of adults and while such
rules of prior restraint may be valid, they nevertheless come to this court with
a presumption against their constitutionality.").
65. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988). The
Court in Hazelwood focused on this issue and based their opinion on the
finding that a school newspaper, as a facility of the school, is a limited public
forum, thus establishing that certain types of speech restrictions are allowed if
they are "reasonable." Id.; see supra note 28.
66. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 269.
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or by practice" any .intent to open the pages of
[the student paper] to "indiscriminate use" by
its student reporters and editors, or by the
student body generally.
Instead, they
"reserve[d] the forum for its intended
purpos[e]" as a supervised learning experience
for journalism students. Accordingly, school
officials were entitled to regulate the contents
of [the student paper] in any reasonable
manner. It is this standard, rather than our
17
decision in Tinker, that governs this case.
Thus, as a limited public forum, schools are allowed to
impose "reasonable restrictions, 61 on all speech occurring in a
school sponsored activity. This includes speech in a student
newspaper, at an assembly, during a school field trip, and
potentially, speech occurring on the Internet. Until the Supreme
Court addresses whether off-campus Internet speech is within a
school's control and develops parameters for determining when
speech crosses onto campus, the lower courts must continue to
guess at what is constitutionally permissible.69
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA

Since 2001, three cases have been decided in Pennsylvania
regarding schools' attempts to punish and restrict students' speech
occurring over the Internet. The first of these cases, Killion v.
70
Franklin Regional School District, concerned a student who was
suspended for creating a humiliating "Top Ten" list about the

67. Id. at 270 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 267.
69. See Seminski, supra note 34, at 176 (suggesting that higher courts
should review this new issue because "electronic publication portends the
emergence of new cases not addressed by the dated traditional student free
speech standards. Consequently, any application of these standards by any
court is misplaced. Without a thorough review of this new medium ... these
cases cannot withstand scrutiny.").
70. 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
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school's athletic director.'
Comments ranging from the athletic
director's appearance to the size of his genitals were included on
the list.7 The list was created by the student at home and sent via
email to a number of his friends. 7' A printed copy of the list
eventually made it to school grounds, though the student creator74
insisted that he never brought the list to school himself.
Nevertheless, the school suspended the student for ten days for
committing verbal or written abuse of a school official.
The district court in Killion chose to apply the standard set
forth in Tinker to both on-campus and off-campus speech.76 The
court found that because the "Top Ten" list was eventually brought
to campus, Tinker applied.77 Applying the Tinker standard, the
court found that the school had violated the student's free speech
rights. The school "failed to satisfy Tinker's substantial disruption
test"7 because the speech was not threatening nor did it lead to any
"actual disruption.,, 79 The court cited Beussink v. Woodland R-IV
School District for the proposition that "[d]isliking or being upset
by the content of a student's speech is not an acceptable
justification for limiting student speech under Tinker."'" In
summary, the Killion court was willing to apply the Tinker standard
to off-campus speech, but it found that the speech in question did
not materially disrupt the school.
The court in Killion also examined whether the student's
speech was lewd or vulgar, in which case the school's restriction or
82
punishment of the speech would be justified under Fraser.
In this

71. Id. at 448-49.
72. Id. at 448.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 448-49.
75. Id. at 449.
76. Id. at 455 ("The overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed
student speech (whether on or off campus) in accordance with Tinker.").
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 30F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
81. Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (citing Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at
1180).
82. Id. at 456-58. The court noted, "In Fraser,the Court made clear that
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part of its analysis, the court did draw a line between on-campus
and off-campus speech, stating that "courts considering lewd and
obscene speech occurring off school grounds have held that
students cannot be punished for such speech, absent exceptional
circumstances."" The court emphasized that "we cannot ignore the
fact that the relevant speech... occurred within the confines of [the
student's] home, far removed from any school premises or
facilities." '
The court determined that because the expression
occurred off campus, the school could not sanction it on vulgarity
grounds. As a result, the court held the school board's policy of
speech regulation to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, in
part because the policy "could be read.., to cover speech occurring
without school premises.""
In 2002, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a
similar issue in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District.' A student
had created a profanity-ridden website mocking his principal and
his teacher in various ways, including morphing the teacher's image
into Adolf Hitler and suggesting that students pitch in twenty
dollars for a hitman. 8 The student accessed the website from
school to show a classmate.8' Eventually an instructor learned of
the website and informed the school principal, who viewed the
site." After the targeted teacher viewed the website, she suffered
severe emotional distress and took a leave of absence from her job.
The school was required to hire numerous substitutes to fill in for

school officials may punish explicit, indecent, or lewd speech... ." Id. at 456

(citing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
83. Id. at 456-57. In making this determination, the court relied on
Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School District, 607 F.2d
1043 (2d Cir. 1979), which concerned an off-campus student newspaper
"specializing in sexual satire." The court in Thomas explained, "Indeed, our
willingness to grant school officials substantial autonomy within their
academic domain rests in part on the confinement of that power within the
metes and bounds of the school itself." Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052.
84. Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 457.
85. Id. at 459.
86. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
87. Id. at 851.
88. Id. at 852.

89. Id.
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the absent teacher throughout the rest of the year., The studentcreator was expelled from his school after the conclusion of the
school year on the grounds that his speech was a threat that
resulted in actual harm.9'
After reviewing the content of the website, the J.S. court
made the preliminary determination that the student did not intend
to convey a "true threat" toward his teacher.9 2 If the statements
had been classified as a "true threat," the speech would not have
been protected by the First Amendment. 93 The court also expressly
noted that the Internet speech must be classified as on-campus or
off-campus speech before their analysis continued.94 In this
statement, the court implied that different rules apply to speech
that takes place off campus. Because the student accessed his
website from a school computer, however, the court classified the
student's activity as on-campus speech. 95 In support of that
determination, the court said:
[The student]... facilitated the on-campus
nature of the speech by accessing the web site
on a school computer in a classroom, showing
90. Id.
91. Id. at 852-53.
92. Id. at 859. In analyzing whether a true threat is present, the court
noted:
Factors to be considered included how the recipient and
other listeners reacted to the alleged threat: whether the
threat was conditional; whether it was communicated
directly to its victim; whether the makers of the threat had
made similar statements to the victim on other occasions;
and whether the victim had reason to believe that the
maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in
violence.
Id. at 858. Using these factors, the court concluded that "the web site, taken
as a whole, was a sophomoric, crude, highly offensive and perhaps misguided
attempt at humor or parody. However, it did not reflect a serious expression
of intent to inflict harm." Id. at 859.
93. Id. at 856 ("In Watts, the United States Supreme Court first
announced that *true threats' fell outside of the protection of the First
Amendment."); see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
94. J.S., 807 A.2d at 864; see supra text accompanying note 46.
95. ld. at 865.
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the site to another student, and by informing
other students at school of the existence of the
website.... Thus, it was inevitable that the
contents of the web site would pass from
students to teachers, inspiring circulation of the
web page on school property. We hold that
where speech that is aimed at a specific school
and/or its personnel is brought onto the school
campus or accessed at school by its originator,
the speech will be considered on-campus
speech.%
Once it decided that the student's speech occurred on
campus, the court applied thg Tinker standard in order to
determine whether the student's speech caused a "material
disruption" or created "substantial disorder" in the school's
activities. 97 The court determined that the "web site caused actual
and substantial disruption of the work of the school," 98 and
therefore the school's act of expelling the student speaker was
justified under Tinker. 9
In 2003, the same federal district court that decided Killion
ruled on a related matter in Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks School
District." " In this case, a student had posted messages on an
Internet message board.. regarding the school's volleyball team, of
which the student was a member.'02 The student posted messages
both from home and from school, using language that the school
deemed offensive." The school discovered the student's posts and
took disciplinary action against the student."M School disciplinary
policy permitted "punishment of speech [by the school] that school

96.
97.
(1969).
98.
99.

Id.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
J.S., 807 A.2d at 869.
Id. at 868-69.

100. 247 F. Supp. 2d 698 (W.D. Pa. 2003).

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 700.
Id. at 700 n.1.
id. at 700-01.
Id.
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officials deem to be 'inappropriate, harassing, offensive or abusive'
without defining those terms or limiting them in relation to
geographic boundaries." "'5
Although the parties had reached a settlement regarding the
student's academic future before the court released an opinion on
° the court struck down the school board's
the school's punishment,'O
policy on regulating student speech as unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad "because they permit a school official to discipline a
student for an abusive, offensive, harassing or inappropriate
expression that occurs outside of school premises and not tied to a
school related activity. Simply put, the Student Handbook policies
could be interpreted to prohibit a substantial amount of protected
speech."'1 7

In holding the school policy unconstitutional, the court
focused on the policy's lack of geographical limitations."' The court
found the policy could be read to cover off-campus speech and
speech unrelated to the school and was therefore unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.'l 9
VI. DISORDER IN THE COURTS

The various and inconsistent outcomes among lower courts
in attempting to apply precedent to this emerging area of law ' °
necessitate action by higher courts in determining specifically what
standards apply to Internet speech."' The unique nature of the

105. Id. at 702.
106. Id. at 701 n.2.
107. Id. at 706.
108. Id. at 705-06.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., id.; Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446
(W.D. Pa. 2001); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash.
2000); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo.
1998) (granting preliminary injunction against school district for suspending a
student from school for his off-campus creation of a website that was critical of
the school administration and was viewed on campus); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area
Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002); see supra notes 8, 53 and text accompany
notes 86-92.
111. See Seminski, supra note 34, at 176-77.
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Internet may require higher courts to create an entirely new
standard for both off-campus student expression and Internet
speech.'12 The Internet is a forum unique to itself; as such, the
courts' "traditional language such as 'schoolhouse gates' and
'behind the counter' are lost in cyberspace."' 113 The courts may have
to realize that certain standards and tests created for traditional
forums are inadequate to meet the challenges raised by this new
medium.
The Supreme Court has already established that Internet
speech is protected under the Constitution.' 4 Lower courts need
the Supreme Court to evaluate Internet speech in the school
context and establish a test that distinguishes between on- and offcampus speech."' Such a test would help eliminate inconsistencies
among the lower courts in defining what is and is not on-campus
speech. Further, the Court's consideration of this issue will confirm
whether purely off-campus student speech has full protection under
the First Amendment.
A two-part test would help the courts in analyzing these
new challenges presented by the Internet. First, the court should
look at student intent. 16 If it can be proven that the student
intended the speech to reach school grounds, the speech is properly
classified as on-campus speech and is subject to school regulation.

112. Id. at 182 ("The Internet is a new medium and should be treated as
such. Applying old standards to such an interactive medium is improper; what
is necessary is some new constitutional standard, not merely a new way in
which current standards are portrayed.").
113. Id. at 180 ("It is virtually impossible to speak of [the Internet] in
tangible terms because it does not exist in a tangible way.").
114. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that
Internet speech is afforded constitutional protection).
115. Tuneski, supra note 7, at 142 ("[Clourts should employ a bright-line
rule clearly distinguishing between on- and off-campus speech by focusing on
the place of origination and dissemination.").
116. See id. at 177 (arguing that the intent of a student speaker is the key
to whether a student's speech should be considered on-campus speech. "If...
the off-campus expression reaches the school passively without any intentional
efforts by the author to disseminate the speech on campus, schools would be
prevented from sanctioning the student for the effects of the speech, even if it
was reasonably foreseeable that it would reach the school.").
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In assessing the difficult task of determining intent, the court should
consider the actions taken by the student as evidence of intent.
Any action taken on school grounds to spread the content of the
website would make the site on-campus speech. Thus, if the
student accessed his or her website on campus and showed it to a
number of friends, the speech becomes on-campus speech, even if
the site had been created off campus. However, if the student sent
an email from home to friends about the website and never
intended the site to be accessed on school grounds or spread
through the school population, the action of sending the email
should not make the website on-campus speech.
Once a determination is made as to the nature of the
speech, the standard for assessing its protections must be
determined.
Student authors of Internet speech created and
disseminated solely off campus should receive full First
Amendment protection, much like the protection given to
completely off-campus underground newspapers."7
Once the
speech becomes on-campus speech, a court must apply one of the
three standards established by the Court for regulation of student
speech. It will be argued that the Tinker standard, while the most
applicable, might not be the most appropriate to use for Internet
student speech.
The courts in J.S. and Flaherty recognized a difference
between on-campus and off-campus speech." 8 But the J.S. court
focused the facts on one solitary student action which made the
student's off-campus speech "on campus," thus bringing the speech
under the jurisdiction of the school." 9 The lack of clarity as to what
acts change originally off-campus Internet speech to on-campus
speech increases the need for established guidelines. Classifying
Internet speech as on-campus speech threatens the potential for

117. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974 (5th Cir.
1972) (holding unconstitutional a school board's attempt to prohibit
distribution of an entirely off-campus newspaper).
118. Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 705-06
(W.D. Pa. 2003); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa.
2002) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)).
119. J.S., 807 A.2d at 865.
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expression embodied and offered by the Internet medm.2
The resource used to access the Internet should not
automatically determine whether the speech has become oncampus speech. Under a factual situation like J.S., the student's
personal access of his or her site on campus should not
consequentially make the speech on-campus.
Still, the court
classified the student speech as on-campus speech partially because
the student speaker accessed the website at school. 1
As a
guideline, a court should consider the student speaker's intention in
accessing his or her site on campus. 12 Much like a personal diary
written with a school-owned pen, a student who accesses his or her
website with no intention to release the site's content into the
school setting should not be subjected to punishment by school
officials. Along the same lines, a student who creates Internet
speech off-campus and clearly intends the speech to reach school

120. Tuneski, supra note 7, at 165. Tuneski concludes:
[Cilassifying internet speech as on-campus expression
threatens to chill speech that would be fully protected if
not spoken in the context of the school environment. If
permitted to punish students for websites created from
home, schools would be afforded significant powers which
could annihilate the First Amendment and privacy rights
of students. A student's comments or criticisms posted on
websites, in chat rooms, or in e-mails could all lead to
school sanctions if the content of the expression were to
somehow disrupt the smooth functioning of the school
campus.... Hence, by failing to classify student internet
speech as off-campus expression, courts take the risk that
student speech will be chilled by the efforts of some
school officials to limit the ability of students to freely
exercise their First Amendment rights in online media.
Id.; cf Robert E. Simpson, Jr., Limits on Students' Speech in the Internet Age,
105 DICK. L. REV. 181, 204 (2001) ("The creator of a website posted on the
Internet without password protection or other security has no reasonable
expectation of privacy.").
121. J.S., 807 A.2d at 865. The court suggested that the content of the
site indicated it was aimed "not at a random audience, but at the specific
audience of students and others connected with [the] particular School
District." Id.
122. See Tuneski, supra note 7, at 177.
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grounds has crossed the threshold to on-campus speech.
If intent cannot be identified, a court should look at any
actions taken by the student speaker. After accessing the website,
for example, if the student set the site as a bookmark in the school
computer or pointed the site out to another student, he or she has
created on-campus speech. Spreading the content of the website to
other students at school creates on-campus speech, but solitary
access of a website should not be considered on-campus speech
solely because the student uses a school-owned computer.'23
The Internet is a window to the world, not an electronic
poster. As such, courts may find it useful to focus on "where the
expression originated and how it was disseminated" '
in
determining whether the speech is on- or off-campus speech. If a
student's site originates off campus, it should remain off-campus
speech unless the author takes some action to spread the website's
content throughout the school.'
Under this theory, only S students
126
who spread the website's content are subject to regulation.
The

123. Id. at 141 ("Allowing internet speech to be considered 'on-campus'
merely because it is viewed at school would circumvent the Court's clear
intention of providing varying degrees of First Amendment protection to
speech according to the environment in which it is expressed."). But see
Rhoda J. Yen, Free Speech on the Internet: Regulating Web Authorship by
Students, COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J., Spring 2000 at 71 ("If a school owns
the equipment and the system resources that enable its students to create
webpages, then the school should enjoy broad rights to monitor and control
the content of those webpages.").
124. Tuneski, supra note 7, at 177. Tuneski argues:
The line between on- and off-campus expression should
be based on where the expression originated and how it
was disseminated. Authors of controversial or offensive
material created and disseminated off school grounds
should only be subjected to the jurisdiction of school
authorities when they take additional steps to bring the
material to a school campus. By taking this additional
step, a speaker decides whether she wishes to subject

herself to the jurisdiction of school officials.
Id.
125. Id.

126. Caplan, supra note 36, at 163 ("If students are gossiping loudly
about another student's off-campus activities instead of paying attention in
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author of such speech could not be punished when it "reaches the
school passively.., even if it was reasonably foreseeable that [the
speech] would reach the school.' , 27 This perspective on student
speech has already been adopted by some jurisdictions2 ' and
maintains the Court's idea that "students... [do not] shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."' 2"9 However, a student who creates a site,
accesses it by himself, and shows it to one friend during the school
day should typically not evoke the "substantial disruption" category
established by Tinker. In the rare case where communication of a
website's content between two students does create a substantial
disruption, Tinker may very well be called upon.
As an example of a lower court attempting to apply
traditional standards to new challenges, the Killion court held that
the Tinker standard should apply to both on- and off-campus
student speech, basing its opinion on an "overwhelming weight of
authority."' 3 However, later decisions in the wake of Tinker have
made it clear that the Court did not intend for the Tinker standard
to extend beyond the school setting."' Decisions from lower courts
class, the gossipers should be disciplined, not the subject of the gossip.").
127. Tuneski, supra note 7, at 177.
128. See Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 968 (5th
Cir. 1972); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash.

2000).
129. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
130. Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D.
Pa. 2001).
131. See Caplan, supra note 36, at 142. Caplan contends the Tinker

Court's mention of "out of class" did not mean "out of school" based on the
context of the Court's opinion. He argues:
Numerous later decisions make clear that the Tinker
standard does not apply to students' off-campus lives. A
decision issued a few months after Tinker explained:
[I]t makes little sense to extend the influence of school
administration to off-campus activity under the theory
that such activity might interfere with the function of
education. School officials may not judge a student's
behavior while he is in his home with his family nor
does it seem to this court that they should have
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and analysis by commentators suggest Internet speech is most
appropriately classified as off-campus speech."2 Contrary to the
Killion court's "overwhelming weight of authority[,]"'33 a number of
courts have respected the distinction between a student's private
speech and his or her on-campus speech. 34 The court in Killion is
an example of lower courts attempting to derive from precedent
some sort of constitutional standard for off-campus Internet speech.
As a result of its virtually blind grasp for a rule, the Killion court
"may be taking Tinker... Fraser... and Hazelwood... to places
go. 1' 1
where the Supreme Court had not intended to
The Tinker standard also gives the government more
control over a person's speech as compared to the general public's

jurisdiction over his acts on a public street corner. A
student is subject to the same criminal laws and owes
the same civil duties as other citizens, and his status as
a student should not alter his obligations during his
private life away from the campus.
Id. (citing Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1340-41
(S.D. Tex. 1969)).
132. See Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1088; Beussink v. Woodland R-IV
Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1178 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Caplan, supra note 36,
at 151 ("The rapidly emerging consensus among courts and commentators is
that Internet speech should be treated as if it occurs off-campus." (citing Coy
v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002)); Leora Harpaz, Internet
Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School Students, 2000 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 123, 160-62; Jennifer Kathleen Swartz, Beyond the Schoolhouse
Gates: Do Students Shed Their Constitutional Rights When Communicating to
a Cyber-Audience?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 587, 602--04 (2000). But see Simpson,
supra note 120, at 198 (arguing, "Language in a student website created at
school or at home is not protected if it causes material disruption at school or
if material disruption at school can be reasonably forecast.").
133. Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
134. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974 (5th
Cir. 1972) ("IT]he width of a street might very well determine the breadth of
the school board's authority."); Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 (declaring
Internet material created by a student at home is "entirely outside of the
school's supervision or control").
135. Bettina Brownstein, Student Rights and the Internet, ARK. LAW.,
Winter 2002, at 11-12.
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speech standards."(' In fact, as the court in Thomas v. Board of
Education, Granville Central School District noted, it is because the
school's power in regulating speech is confined to exist only within
their walls that schools are given such a great power over their
student population, a power which would normally infringe the
rights of the public. 37 To apply Tinker outside of the school walls
would be to subject a portion of our citizens to a lower standard of
freedom of speech, and, in effect, subjecting them to a separate Bill
of Rights." Just as the "less stringent" rules for conducting student
136. Cf Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional
Rights? Keeping Order in Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 49, 98
(1996). Professor Dupre argues the Tinker Court took away power from
public school officials by restricting regulation of student speech to only those
instances where the speech substantially disrupts school activity. She writes:
Requiring substantial interference or material disruption
to the education process to occur before a teacher can
discipline a student for expression simply does not allow
schools to create an environment where serious learning
will consistently occur. Even a 'slight' disruption can
derail a class for a significant period of time. Thus, the
Tinker Court's substantial interference standard was
based on a fundamentally flawed perception of the reality
of the classroom. Although the Court seemed to concede
that the school has certain pedagogical concerns, it erred
when it second-guessed the school officials' judgment
about the effect of the Vietnam protest on school students
and the education process.

Id.
137. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043,
1052 (1979) ("Indeed, our willingness to grant school officials substantial
autonomy within their academic domain rests in part on the confinement of
that power within the metes and bounds of the school itself.").
138. See Tuneski, supra note 7, at 172. Tuneski notes:
[lIt stands to reason that any number of things during the
course of a day cause similar distractions that interfere
somewhat with the smooth functioning of a classroom.
Such a low and indefinite threshold for punishing
expression may be justifiable in the context of on-campus
speech, but applying such an easily satisfied standard to
off-campus speech would have a chilling effect on
speakers in otherwise fully protected forums.
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searches are limited to on-campus or school-sponsored events, so
too should the "less stringent" rules for regulating student speech
be confined to school grounds.'3 Considering the fact that school
attendance is mandatory in all states, some courts have created a
situation where citizens between the ages of five and sixteen are
governed by a more restrictive speech code solely because of their
youth. Whether the speaker is a child or an adult, "it is provocative
and challenging speech... which is most in need of the protections
of the First Amendment ....The First Amendment was designed
for this very purpose."' 4' Neither the Tinker standard, nor any
other speech restrictive standard, should be applied to speech
uttered off school grounds. The restrictions on a student's right to
freedom of speech were reasonably created to give schools the
ability to foster a more educational atmosphere at school. They
were not, however, created to give schools the power to conform
the minds and mouths of14 America's youth to whatever is acceptable
for a local school board.

The Killion court could have made its decision regarding
the "Top Ten" list by looking at the intent and action of the student
speaker. Using the previously proposed test, the court would find
that there is little evidence of an express intent by the student to
bring his speech onto the school grounds. 4 2 The student did,

139. Caplan, supra note 36, at 147.
140. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175,
1182 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
141. See e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
511(1969). The Court declared:
In our system, students may not be regarded as closedcircuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
They may not be confined to the
communicate.
expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech,
students are entitled to freedom of expression of their
views.
Id.
142. Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (W.D.
Pa. 2001).
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however, send the list to a number of his friends.' The sending of
emails by itself does not establish student intent for the list to reach
school grounds. It would seem that the student only meant for the
list to be viewed by a select few. Barring evidence showing the
student speaker intended otherwise, such as telling his friends to
pass along the email to everyone they knew, the student's speech
should have retained its off-campus status and therefore its full
First Amendment protection. It therefore seems incorrect to apply
Tinker to off-campus speech as the Killion court did.
If a court wishes to apply Tinker to student Internet speech
classified as on-campus speech, it should do so by applying an
objective-reaction test to determine if the disruption caused by the
speech was material or substantial. As an illustration of the need
for a objective-reaction test, consider the teacher's reaction in J.S.
The court in J.S. seemed too quick to call the website a material
disruption by looking only at the arguably irrational reaction of one
individual.'44 The court determined that the student website caused
a substantial disruption in the school because of the reaction it
invoked from a teacher.'4 5 A website that directs incredible
negativity toward a teacher can very reasonably cause "substantial
disorder" or a "material disrupt[ion]""146 in schools, especially in the
wake of Columbine and other incidents of school violence. 7
However, based on the court's classification of the student website
as a "misguided attempt at humor" and not a "true threat,"'4 8 the
143. Id.
144. See Tuneski, supra note 7, at 171 ("While the content of the
student's site [in J.S.] cannot be condoned, police investigators concluded that
the threats.., were not true threats of danger. Because there was no actual
threat to the teacher's life, it could be argued that the teacher's response was
not a rational or foreseeable reaction to the student's site.").
145. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 2002).
146. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
147. J.S., 807 A.2d at 860.
148. Id at 859. The court concluded:
Cognizant of the narrowness of the exceptions to the right
of free speech, and the criminal nature of a true threat
analysis, we conclude that the statements made by J.S. did
not constitute a true threat, in light of the totality of the
circumstances present here. We believe that the web site,
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teacher's leave of absence and emotional distress over the website
hardly seems a "rational or foreseeable reaction to the student's
site.""" The J.S. court contends that "[k]eeping in mind the unique
nature of the school setting and the student's diminished rights
therein, while there must be more than some mild distraction or
curiosity created by the speech, complete chaos is not required for a
school district to punish student speech."" However, under the J.S.
court's rationale, if every teacher in the nation reacted the same
way as the teacher in J.S., regardless of the website's content, no
student would be free from punishment in expressing dislike of a
teacher. 5'
For the reasons stated above, an objective-reaction test
would determine more effectively the extent of the disruption in a
case like J.S.112 Such a test would require a court to analyze student
expression by considering first "how a reasonable person would
perceive the specific utterance, before assessing whether the speech
disrupts the educational environment."" 3 Second, the court would
complete "an objective evaluation of the language of the threat,
under a reasonable person test.""'
Considering the increase in the volume of communication

taken as a whole, was a sophomoric, crude, highly
offensive and perhaps misguided attempt at humor or
parody. However, it did not reflect a serious expression
of intent to inflict harm.

Id.
149. Tuneski, supra note 7, at 171.
150. J.S., 807 A.2d at 868 (citations omitted).
151. See Tuneski, supra note 7, at 171-72. Tuneski argues:
If a student could be punished anytime that a teacher is
upset by the magnitude and strength of the student's offcampus criticism, students would have little First
Amendment protection. Setting the standard of First
Amendment protection on the reaction of listeners
threatens to abridge far more speech than is
constitutionally permissible.
Id. (emphasis added).

152. See Seminski, supra note 34, at 181-82.

153. Id. at 182.
154. Id.
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the Internet brings to the school setting, continued application of
the original Tinker standard to the passive Internet medium "could
be just another recipe for disaster without a clear precedent from
the courts."' i The Internet allows teachers to access private
student thoughts, both innocent and harsh. Without an objective
application of the Tinker test to these abundant student statements,
a school might have the ability to restrict the most minute student
speech which was never intended to be read by school officials,
much less cause the disruption perceived by the school
administration.
In short, purely off-campus speech should remain under the
full protection of the First Amendment.
Previously noted
precedent holds that speech which occurs and is intended to remain
off campus cannot be regulated by school officials, even if the
speech leaks onto school grounds. 15 However, Internet speech is a
type of off-campus speech that is more accessible on school grounds
than any other communication medium. As such, schools have an
interest in regulating speech coming from the Internet into their
classrooms in order to maintain a proper learning environment.
Because of its unique characteristics, the higher courts need to
address the role of Internet speech in the school context, which may
require a new test for restricting student Internet speech. One test
would be to leave off-campus Internet speech as off-campus speech,
and thus protected by the First Amendment, until the student
speaker either intends and/or commits some act which brings the
Internet speech to campus. Additionally, once the Internet speech
has been classified as "on campus" due to the student's actions or
established intentions, the Tinker standard should be applied in
determining the speech's effect on the school. However, the Tinker
test should be evaluated from a reasonable person's view; irrational
disruptive reactions to student Internet speech should not bring
about student punishment for the speech.

155. Id.

156. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 978 (5th Cir.
1972).
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VII. CONCLUSION

"The First Amendment recognizes a danger in
governmental action having a chilling effect on speech because it
gives rise to self-censorship and diminishment of the marketplace of
' 7
ideas. Free speech needs breathing room to serve its purpose.' 1
Even so, the courts feel it is just as important to foster a suitable
educational environment. To reach a balance, the Court has
allowed certain restrictions on student speech to achieve the state's
basic educational mission.
However, the courts did not mean for school boards to have
entire control over a student's expressive life. The Supreme Court
in Tinker limited their ruling by recognizing that "[s]chool officials
do not possess absolute authority over their students."'58 While
courts have later identified these boundaries to include school
sponsored events occurring off school grounds, the Supreme Court
has never, nor should it ever, extended the power to regulate
student expression occurring in private life outside of school. The
Tinker standard should not be applied to off-campus speech.
Off-campus speech includes expression on the Internet, a
forum that is created off campus but is easily accessible on campus.
While Internet speech can potentially permeate the school walls,
the origin of the speech and the intention of the author should be
the ultimate factors for determining whether the speech classifies as
on- or off-campus speech. 159 In other words, the student's actions
should only qualify as on-campus speech if the student author
creates the website at school or commits some other intentional act
to spread the content of the website to the population of the school.
Regardless of the student's intentions, if the student creates a site
that is considered a true threat, that speech is not deserving of First
Amendment protection.'9
Additionally, any student Internet
speech that is both intended and actually brought onto campus

157.
158.
(1969).
159.
160.

Caplan, supra note 36, at 148.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
Tuneski, supra note 7, at 177.
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. 2002).
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should be subject to school discipline only if a reasonable person
would consider the speech disruptive under the Tinker test. Only
under these circumstances should the student's acts subject him or
her to school regulation.
Schools historically have adapted and will continue to adapt
to any new challenges, such as the Internet. However, such
adaptations should not be made at the expense of the right to
freedom of speech.'6' Schools have dealt with student expression
for decades, be it through silent political demonstrations, speeches
at school assemblies, or through student newspapers; schools have
adjusted as needed to preserve the educational atmosphere. This
country has yet to see a school crumble because of a student's crass
or even personally damaging words.
Fostering the school
environment by ridding the school of disruptive speech is one thing,
but stepping over court-defined boundaries into a student's private
life "for the sake of the school environment" is not consistent with
the current precedent. The Tinker Court noted, "[t]he classroom is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth, 'out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.' ,,6
"Such a vision of the public school system cannot be
attained by further suppressing student speech. Internet student
speech occurring off school grounds contributes to the
"marketplace of ideas." In doing so, Internet speech should remain
off-campus speech, entitling the student speaker to full protection
of the First Amendment, until the speaker takes action to bring the
speech on campus.
There are a large number of speech issues presented by
student use of the Internet that were left unexplored by this Note.
161. Caplan, supra note 36, at 154 (citing Beidler v. N. Thurston Sch.
Dist., No. 99-2-00236-6 (Wash. Super. Ct. July 18, 2000), available at
http://www.aclu-wa.org/legal/Beidler-Court's%200pinion.html (on file with
the First Amendment Law Review)). The court in Beidler concluded,
"Schools can and will adjust to the new challenges created by such students
and the internet, but not at the expense of the First Amendment." Id.
162. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
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However, before the minute details of this topic are addressed, a
threshold between on- and off-campus Internet speech needs to be
created. Additionally, the courts need to decide which student
speech precedents are most appropriate to apply to the new
Internet medium. When needed, the courts must adjust previous
standards or create new tests to fully tackle the challenges created
by the increased interaction of students and the Internet. Until the
appellate courts take up this topic, lower courts will continue to
produce inconsistent tests and results, and students will be left in
the dark as to the extent of their speech rights in this new medium
of communication.

